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INTRODUCTION 
The development and publication of any law of war manual is not easy.  This is 
particularly so when the focus is on an area such as air and missile warfare that 
involves relatively new technology that is the subject of few international treaties and 
does not always easily fit within the legal traditions that emerge from many centuries 
of conflicts on the land and sea domains.1  Moreover, when it involves a means and 
method of warfare that largely is dominated by a few countries, the challenge is even 
more daunting to reconcile the legitimate concerns of the leading aviation powers 
with those of the rest of the family of nations. 
All of this makes the development of the Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (AMW Manual)2 such a towering 
achievement.  Fortunately, it was shepherded to success by an individual of 
 
* Major General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1975; B.A., St. 
Joseph’s University, 1972.  Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, 2006–10.  Visiting Professor 
and Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law. 
1. See generally Javier Guisández Gómez, The Law of Air Warfare, 323 INT’L REV. OF THE RED 
CROSS (1998), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jpcl.htm. 
2. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009), available at http://ihlresearch 
.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]. 
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Brobdingnagian intellect, energy, patience, and determination:  Professor Claude 
Bruderlein, the director of Harvard’s Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research, who was central to the success of the effort.  Undoubtedly, he would be 
the first to insist on crediting Professor Yoram Dinstein, whose significance to this 
project cannot be overstated.  Still, the fact that this project overcame so many 
obstacles is much due to Professor Bruderlein’s tireless efforts. 
The publication of the AMW Manual is extremely timely, coming as it does at a 
time in history when air warfare is increasingly becoming the weaponry of choice to 
battle transnational terrorists, especially in remote locations.  That said, any 
assessment of the role of law of war manuals, to include the AMW Manual, must 
acknowledge the heritage of the Lieber Code,3 which was produced long before 
powered aircraft or missiles became commonplace instruments of war.  Many 
authorities consider this Civil War-era document the “seminal step” in the “detailed 
codification and exposition of the laws of war.”4  It was, historians say, “the first 
instance in western history in which the government of a sovereign nation established 
formal guidelines for its army’s conduct toward its enemies.”5  Since the Lieber Code, 
a number of manuals of various styles have been produced. 
Hays Parks, speaking in November 2010 about the drafting of the as yet 
unreleased U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual (DoD Manual), 
detailed the role of law of war manuals in the development of the modern law of 
armed conflict (LOAC).6  He, too, noted the importance of the Lieber Code, but also 
listed the 1914 edition of the U.S. War Department’s Rules of Land Warfare as well 
as other American and foreign manuals as examples of the genre.7  From his study, 
Parks, who is the principal drafter of the forthcoming DoD Manual, concludes that 
the best manuals “explain the law with State practice examples,” and that is the style 
he chose for the DoD Manual.8 
Because of this different approach, the DoD Manual is expected to weigh in at 
over 1,000 pages and be documented with more than 3,000 footnotes.9  According to 
Parks, this more detailed explication is intended to add perspective to the rules, 
complete with illustrations, so that practitioners in particular will understand the 
intended context of the law and policy pronouncements the DoD Manual is expected 
to contain.10  Again, Parks’ view is that “providing a treaty text without explanation, 
 
3. U.S. War Dep’t, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United states in the Field, Gen. 
Orders No. 100 (1863), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument. 
4. STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS:  A GENERAL HISTORY 186 (2005). 
5. Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan:  Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, and 
Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 99 (Christopher H. Schroeder & 
Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (quoting RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE & THE LAW OF 
WAR 1–2 (1983)). 
6. W. Hays Parks, Former Senior Assoc. Deputy Counsel, Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Def., National 
Security Law in Practice:  The Department of Defense Law of War Manual, Speech at the ABA Standing 
Committee on Law and National Security Breakfast Series 1–7 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/natsecurity/hays_parks_speech11082010.authcheck
dam.pdf. 
7. Id. at 1. 
8. Id. at 5. 
9. Id. at 8. 
10. W. Hays Parks, Former Senior Assoc. Deputy Counsel, Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Def., U.S. and The 
Laws of War, Summary of the International Law Discussion Group Meeting Held at Chatham House 16 
(Feb. 21, 2011), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International 
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clarification, elaboration, or evidence of State practice (other than similar manuals), 
has resulted in lawyers, military and civilian, incorrectly viewing law of war treaties 
as the sole source for the law.”11 
The Commentary to the AMW Manual serves something of a similar purpose.12  
For U.S. government practitioners, this is, however, somewhat problematic—as any 
such document built upon the unofficial contributions of experts from a variety of 
nations is likely to be.  U.S. government military operations are often dominated by 
American policy considerations, to include interpretations of international law that 
may not be shared by other nations.  As will be discussed in more detail below, this is 
especially so with respect to customary international law that is reflected in both the 
AMW Manual and its Commentary. 
This short essay is intended to provide some perspectives on the role the AMW 
Manual can play in the future.  It aims to provide special emphasis on the practical 
issues associated with air and missile operations.  It assesses the potential of the 
manual to turn the norms it promotes into accepted practice among nations, if not 
into customary international law. 
I. THE AMW MANUAL’S EDUCATIVE FUNCTION 
Beyond its potential as a norm-setter in international law, the AMW Manual 
could provide an enormous service by helping to teach not just military audiences but 
also the public at large the fundamentals of the law applicable to air and missile 
warfare.  Education about the law applicable to these technologies is critical.  In the 
larger context, Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions already recognizes the 
importance of efforts like the AMW Manual by calling upon the parties to 
“encourage the study [of the Conventions] by the civilian population.”13 
Though the United States is not a party to the Protocol,14 and it is doubtful that 
this section would be considered customary international law, it nevertheless makes 
practical sense.  Why?  Consider what Professors Michael Riesman and Chris T. 
Antoniou contend in their 1994 book, The Laws of War:  “In modern popular 
democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of popular 
support.  That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy 
the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, 
inhumane, or iniquitous way.”15 
 
%20Law/il210211summary.pdf. 
11. Id. at 9. 
12. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE 
HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2010), 
available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf; see also 
AMW MANUAL, supra note 2, at iii (“[T]he Commentary clarifies the prominent legal interpretations and 
indicates differing perspectives.”). 
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
AP I]. 
14. See States Parties, Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
(June 8 1977), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P#ratif (last visited Jan. 14, 
2012) (U.S. not included as a party). 
15. W. MICHAEL RIESMAN & CHRIS T. ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR xxiv (1994). 
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In order for “people” to make the appropriate judgment about the war’s 
conduct, they need to understand exactly what the rules require.  In this country, 
however, there is considerable evidence that such an understanding is wanting.  For 
example, in a survey released in April 2011, the American Red Cross found that 
“only 1 in 5 American youth is familiar with the Geneva Conventions”16 and just 44% 
“believe that rules and laws governing actions in war are a good way to reduce 
human suffering.”17  The only encouraging bit of news from this survey is that nearly 
80% of youth recognize the need for better instruction on the law of war.18 
Of course, the first priority has to be ensuring that those in the armed forces and 
in the civilian defense establishment have a keen understanding of the law of war.  In 
this respect, the AMW Manual is especially well-suited because it clearly displays the 
central concepts in a cogent and direct format; even the physical shape of the manual 
is such that it easily slips into a cargo pocket of the military uniform.  Attention to 
such details is an important attribute of a document intended for real-world use. 
Having the law readily accessible to those who must use it is necessary not just 
to conform to moral and legal requirements, but also for practical, warfighting 
reasons—particularly for modern democracies that honor the rule of law.  Professor 
William Eckhart points out that today’s adversaries aim to turn adherence to and 
respect for the rule of law into vulnerabilities.  He says: 
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands 
compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as 
illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law 
of war.  Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von 
Clausewitz would term our “center of gravity.”19 
This is especially true in the kind of “irregular” conflicts that predominate 
today.20  There is no question that many belligerents in such conflicts seek to gain an 
advantage by portraying U.S. and other forces as violating the law of war, and thus 
erode the popular support that Professors Riesman and Antoniou say democracies 
need to sustain a warfighting effort.21  In particular, they try to show that the United 
States and other nations with air war capabilities are violating the principle of 
distinction—which Professor Gary Solis characterizes as “the most significant 
battlefield concept a combatant must observe”22—by causing civilian casualties in 
airstrikes. 
 
16. Press Release, American Red Cross, Red Cross Survey Finds Young Americans Unaware of 
Rules of War (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.94aae335470e233 
f6cf911df43181aa0/?vgnextoid=801dbe9f0e64f210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD. 
17. SURVEY ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AMERICAN RED CROSS 7 (March 2011), 
available at http://www.redcross.org/www-files/Documents/pdf/international/IHL/IHLSurvey.pdf. 
18. Id. at 14. 
19. William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword, 4 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 431, 441 (2003). 
20. The U.S. Department of Defense defines “irregular warfare” as a “violent struggle among state 
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).  Irregular warfare favors 
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 
capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”  Irregular Warfare, DICTIONARY 
OF MILITARY TERMS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/i/19843.html. 
21. RIESMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 15, at xxiv. 
22. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 251 (2010).  This legal principle requires 
combatants to at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against the 
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Candidly, they have enjoyed some success in Afghanistan, where “Afghan anger 
over civilian casualties has been a long-standing issue . . . [and civilian casualties] 
dominate Afghan critiques of international forces.”23  Unsurprisingly, Afghan 
militants have made orchestrating such events a centerpiece of their strategy.  
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in 2009 that in Afghanistan, 
“provoking or exploiting civilian casualties is a ‘princip[al] strategic tactic’ of the 
Taliban.”24  This is particularly true with respect to airpower because it is a military 
capability that they do not have and that they cannot defend against with the 
weaponry they typically possess.25  Accordingly, they try to use the civilian casualty 
issue as a way of limiting the use of airpower by creating political pressure, often by 
exploiting popular misconceptions about the law.26 
Defeating this tactic requires knowledge of the law of armed conflict as 
applicable especially to air operations, and the AMW Manual can help provide that.  
An absence of such knowledge and, indeed, understanding, can have profoundly 
unproductive unintended consequences.27  A classic example is the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) clumsy efforts to offset Taliban manipulation of the 
civilian casualty issue.  NATO virtually invited problems when it announced in June 
2007 that its forces “would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians 
nearby.”28  Just a year later, a spokesman reiterated that “[i]f there is the likelihood 
of even one civilian casualty, [NATO] will not strike, not even if we think Osama bin 
Laden is down there.”29 
The law of armed conflict—as is clear in the AMW Manual—certainly does 
not demand such deference.30  “By creating restrictions beyond what [LOAC] would 
 
latter.  Id. 
23. Erica Gaston, Karzai’s Civilian Casualty Ultimatum, FOREIGN POLICY (Jun. 2, 2011), http://afpak. 
foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/02/karzais_civilian_casualties_ultimatum. 
24. John J. Kruzel, U.S. Denies Using White Phosphorous in Afghanistan, Gates Pledges More 
Investigation, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (May 11, 2009), http://www.defense.gov/news/ 
newsarticle.aspx?id=54294. 
25. Cf. Erin Cunningham, Taliban Attack Highlights Its Growing Power, GLOBALPOST (Aug. 7, 
2011), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/afghanistan/110807/taliban-attack-
highlights-its-growing-power (explaining that the Taliban does not currently “maintain serious anti-aircraft 
capabilities”). 
26. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 121, 130 
(2011) [hereinafter Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?] (“Exploiting civilian casualties, or more 
academically, exploiting the adherence—or lack thereof—to the law of armed conflict axiom of distinction 
has become the ‘principle strategic tactic’ of the Taliban much out of sheer necessity.” (quoting then-U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, quoted in John J. Kruzel, U.S. Denies Using White Phosphorous in 
Afghanistan, Gates Pledges More Investigation, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE (May 11, 2009), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54294)). 
27. See id. at 133–35 (discussing the “unintended consequences” of restrictions the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization placed on airstrikes in response to concerns about civilian casualties). 
28. Noor Kahn, Afghan Civilians Said Killed in Clash, WASH. POST (June 30, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063000028.html (quoting Maj. 
John Thomas, spokesman for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force). 
29. Pamela Constable, NATO Hopes to Undercut Taliban with ‘Surge’ of Projects, WASH. POST (Sept. 
27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/26/AR2008092603452_pf.html 
(quoting Brig. Gen. Richard Blanchette, chief spokesman for NATO forces). 
30. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Lawfare Amid Warfare, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2007), http://www. 
washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/03/lawfare-amid-warfare/?page=1 (explaining that international law 
recognizes “legitimate attacks on combatants” that may put civilians at risk). 
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require, NATO’s pronouncements encourage the Taliban to shield themselves from 
air attack by violating the law of armed conflict [by] embedding themselves among 
civilians.”31  And this is exactly what has happened.32  Nevertheless, when he took 
command of NATO operations in Afghanistan in June 2009, General Stanley A. 
McChrystal put in place new restrictions on airstrikes in an effort to limit civilian 
casualties, even though only a small percentage of the civilian losses were 
attributable to airstrikes.33  Tragically, a year after the restrictive policy was put in 
place, the United Nations (U.N.) reported that civilian casualties skyrocketed by 
31%34 and Coalition military casualties reached an all-time high.35  The policy was a 
stunning failure from every perspective as it had precisely the opposite effect than 
that intended. 
General David Petraeus replaced General McChrystal in June 2010 and put in 
place rules that were more permissive36 and resulted in a 65% increase in the number 
of airstrikes in his first year.37  Importantly, not only did the security situation in 
Afghanistan improve, but civilian and military casualties also decreased remarkably.  
Civilian casualties dropped from about 230 per month in 2010 to about 115 per 
month in the first five months of 2011,38 85% of which were caused by the Taliban 
 
31. Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, supra note 26, at 134. 
32. Id. at 134 n.67. 
33. See Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, Tactical Directive (2009), available in part at 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf (“The use of air-to-ground 
munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and 
prescribed conditions . . . .”); U.N. Assistance Mission to Afg., Afghanistan:  Mid Year Bulletin on 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009, 10–11, (Jul. 31, 2009), http://unama.unmissions.org/ 
Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/09july31-UNAMA-HUMAN-RIGHTS-CIVILIAN-CASUALTIES-
Mid-Year-2009-Bulletin.pdf (reporting that 20% of the total number of civilian casualties were caused by 
airstrikes, which is lower than the previous year, in which airstrikes caused 26% of the total civilian 
casualties). 
34. Afghan Civilian Casualties Rise 31 Per Cent in First Six Months of 2010, U.N. ASSISTANCE 
MISSION IN AFG. (Aug. 10, 2010), http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1741&ctl=Details 
&mid=1882&ItemID=9955. 
35. Elena Becatoros, 700 NATO Troops Killed in Afghanistan in 2011, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2010), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/28/700-nato-troops-killed-afghanistan-2010 (“This year is 
by far the deadliest for the coalition . . . .”). 
36. See Julian E. Barnes, Petraeus Resets Afghan Airstrike Rules, WSJ.COM (Aug. 1, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703314904575399770077260834.html (“describing General 
Petraeus’ easing of a specific use of force rule and his “broader effort . . . to review [General McChrystal’s] 
tactical directive limiting airstrikes”). 
37. Noah Shachtman & Spencer Ackerman, 5,800 Attacks Are Just the Beginning After Petraeus’ 
Year-Long Air War, WIRED (Jul. 5, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/5800-attacks-are-
just-the-beginning-after-petraeus-year-long-air-war/#more-50792. 
38. SUSAN G. CHESSER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4108, AFGHANISTAN CASUALTIES:  MILITARY 
FORCES AND CIVILIANS 2–3 (June 9, 2011), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=8855 (showing in a table the 
civilian casualties in 2010 and January-May 2011 in Afghanistan).  Regrettably, in February 2012 the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported that by the end of 2011, civilian casualties had 
risen 8% over 2010.  U.N. Assistance Mission to Afg., Afghanistan:  Annual Report 2011, Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict 1, (Feb. 2012), http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/ 
UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf.  The report attributes 77% of “conflict-
related” civilian deaths in 2011 to “Anti-Government Elements.”  Id.  The report also indicates that the 
increased pace of air attacks that paralleled a reduction in the number of civilian deaths did not persist, as 
it states that in 2011 there was a “reduced number of aerial operations.”  Id. at 24.  Aerial attacks were 
responsible for just 187 of the 3,021 civilian deaths in 2011.  Id. at 1, 24. 
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and al-Qaeda, not the Coalition.39  Moreover, Coalition fatalities, which averaged 
nearly sixty per month in 2010, fell in 2011.40 
The logic of the Petraeus approach seems clear:  by seizing the opportunity to 
use airpower more liberally (but fully consonant with LOAC), fewer enemies 
escaped.  Since the enemy kills the overwhelming number of civilians, removing 
more adversaries from the equation naturally reduces the peril to noncombatants.  It 
certainly serves no military or humanitarian purpose to create a de facto sanctuary 
for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters by a policy pronouncement that erodes the 
underlying rationale for the law of war’s rule.  In short, the numbers indicate that 
increasing airstrikes actually decreases the number of civilian and military deaths.  In 
fact, a U.N. report released in March 2011 declared that “[a]lthough the number of 
air strikes increased exponentially, the number of civilian casualties from air strikes 
decreased in 2010.”41 
To be sure, criticism of U.S. airstrikes continues, but the rationale may not be as 
much about violating the law or even the deaths, per se.  After all, a 2010 study found 
that airstrikes were responsible for less than a sixth of all civilian deaths attributable 
to Coalition actions.42  Indeed, traffic accidents with NATO vehicles killed more 
Afghan women and children than did airstrikes.43  Rather, the criticism may be 
something of a veiled protest against the presence of foreign ground troops.  
Reporter Alissa Rubin remarked in the New York Times that even though the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda cause the vast majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, 
“those that are caused by NATO troops appear to reverberate more deeply because 
of underlying animosity about foreigners in the country.”44 
When the law is well understood, and is informed by relevant cultural factors, it 
is easier to parse the subtleties.  In this instance, for example, if NATO’s desire was 
to limit Afghan protests due to civilian deaths, then the better approach might have 
been to limit the number of troops on the ground, not the airstrikes that kill those 
doing most of the killing of civilians.  Ironically, troops on the ground are related to 
the civilian casualties that do occur from airstrikes.  A study released by Human 
Rights Watch in 2008 reported that the “vast majority of known civilian deaths” 
caused by airstrikes came from those called in by ground forces under insurgent 
attack.45  Following the law as outlined in the AMW Manual, as opposed to trying to 
 
39. Jim Michaels, Taliban Behind Most Afghan Civilian Casualties, USA TODAY (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/2011-06-22-afghan-civilian-casualties_n.htm. 
40. Coalition Military Fatalities By Year and Month, ICASUALTIES.ORG, http://icasualties.org/OEF/ 
Index.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (showing that Coalition casualties fell to 566 in 2011 from 711 in 
2010). 
41. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afg. & Afg. Indep. Human Rights Comm’n, Afghanistan:  Annual 
Report 2010, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 24 (Mar. 2011), http://unama.unmissions.org/ 
Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf. 
42. Luke N. Condra et al., The Effect of Civilian Causalities in Afghanistan and Iraq 39, (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16152, 2010, revised 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w16152 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
43. Id. 
44. Alissa J. Rubin, Afghan Leader Calls Apology in Boys’ Deaths Insufficient, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/world/asia/07afghanistan.html. 
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TROOPS IN CONTACT” AIRSTRIKES AND CIVILIAN DEATHS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 29–30, (2008), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2008/afghanistan0908/afghanistan0908 
web.pdf. 
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“improve” upon it, is much more likely to produce the desired military and strategic 
outcome. 
II. THE AMW MANUAL AND THE DOD MANUAL 
The AMW Manual aims to apply to all nations, but in reality, accomplishing 
that end is a profoundly challenging proposition.  Afghanistan is a good example of 
why this is true.  Given that international law is comprised principally of treaties and 
customary international law,46 the fact that not all Coalition partners may be parties 
to the same international agreements can—and does—create complication in 
Afghanistan. 
Still, manuals such as the AMW Manual, along with its Commentary, are very 
helpful in identifying relevant provisions of both sources; however, it is the 
determination of customary international law that is, by far, the most problematic.  
At the end of the day, it is principally state practice—at least with respect to the law 
of armed conflict—that will define customary international law.47  It may be that 
manuals can play a role in developing or even initiating state practice (and some 
could understandably argue that the Lieber Code did just that), but they are not 
themselves an independent source of customary international law. 
Defining customary international law in the context of the law of war has 
proven to be especially difficult.  Indeed, I think that this will always be the rub with 
law of armed conflict manuals:  to what degree can nations agree with what is, in fact, 
customary international law in that context?  The United States, for example, has 
sharply differed in the past with interpretations that the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) and others have claimed for customary international law in 
armed conflicts.48  In the case of the dispute with the ICRC, the United States took 
most issue with the sources relied upon to determine customary international law, 
and it seems clear that recitation of a particular principle in a law of war manual 
would not be deemed sufficient.49 
Obviously, the AMW Manual has to come to conclusions as to customary 
international law, and in some instances those conclusions may prove to be at odds 
with the U.S. interpretation.  Exactly how much of a difference there may be is hard 
to say, because the official U.S. government views are not as definitively elucidated 
as one might hope.  That, however, could change with the much-anticipated issuance 
of the aforementioned U.S. DoD Law of War Manual, the drafting of which Hays 
Parks oversaw for more than a decade prior to his retirement in 2010.50  I suspect that 
much of it will be in agreement with the AMW Manual, but there could well be 
important differences. 
 
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987). 
47. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. para. 1b, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (stating 
that the International Court of Justice shall apply, inter alia, “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law”). 
48. See, e.g., Jim Garamone, DoD, State Department Criticize Red Cross Law of War Study, 
AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx? 
id=3308 (discussing criticism by lawyers in the DoD and the State Department of the methodology used in 
an ICRC study purporting to be the “definitive explanation of the laws of war”). 
49. Id. 
50. See Parks, supra note 6, at 7–8 (describing the process of drafting the new manual). 
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Unfortunately, it now appears that the issuance of the DoD Manual will be 
delayed as the coordination with agencies outside the DoD apparently is taking 
longer than expected.51  As the recent controversy over the legal status of air 
operations against Libya illustrates, there are evidently serious divides within the 
U.S. government legal community about some rather basic questions.52 
The precise nature of the dispute may be unknown, but it is indeed worrisome 
that a manual that was drafted principally by current and former military lawyers 
(and peer-reviewed by world-renowned experts)53 might nevertheless be caught up in 
policy quarrels.  In a way, it is reminiscent of previous disputes between military and 
civilian lawyers as to other law of war issues arising since 9/11.54  Regardless, this will 
make the AMW Manual especially valuable, as it will fill, if not a lacuna in the law, a 
lacuna in available manuals specializing in this aspect of warfare. 
In any event, whenever the DoD Manual is finally published, its analysis of 
customary international law will likely not be accepted by all, but it will reflect state 
practice at least with respect to the United States.  There are those who will say, 
understandably, that U.S. practice does not, ipso facto, define state practice for the 
purpose of defining customary international law.  Yet in the area of air and missile 
warfare especially, the U.S. view will doubtless be authoritative if not controlling.  
The United States is, and will likely continue to be for the foreseeable future, the 
foremost practitioner of air and missile warfare.  In terms of actual warfighting 
experience, there are a few nations with some current experience, but none with the 
dimension of that of the United States.  Moreover, the United States is—for now 
anyway—the leader in air and missile technology. 
III. TECHNOLOGY, ROE, AND THE AMW MANUAL 
PRACTITIONER 
Along this line, allow me to observe that it has been my experience that with 
respect to air and missile weapons, the erudition in the law of some commentators 
and legal scholars is not always matched by a sophisticated understanding of the 
weapons and delivery systems, not to mention the doctrine and strategies for their 
use.  This hobbles their analysis and, frankly, undermines the weight their views are 
given by warfighters, who may consider their legal views too uninformed by the facts 
to be useful. 
 
51. This observation is based on the author’s conversations and correspondence with U.S. 
Department of Defense attorneys and others with relevant knowledge. 
52. Administration lawyers apparently could not agree as to whether or not U.S. involvement in 
NATO’s combat operations over Libya constituted “hostilities” within the meaning of the War Powers 
Resolution.  Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html. 
53. See Parks, supra note 6, at 7–8 (“The peer review consisted of senior military legal officers from 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; four U.S. law professors from top U.S. law 
schools with extensive knowledge of the law of war; and Sir Adam Roberts, a distinguished British 
professor of history with long-time interest in the law of war.”). 
54. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Tale of Two Judges:  A Judge Advocate’s Reflections on Judge 
Gonzales’ Apologia, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 893, 894, 906–908 (2010) (describing the ideological conflicts 
between then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s civilian “War Council” and JAG attorneys post-9/11). 
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Without a great deal of technical acumen beyond the law, it is simply impossible 
to be an effective legal advisor for U.S. air and missile operations, regardless of legal, 
qua legal, expertise.  Consider that such operations are typically controlled by 
Combined Air and Space Operations Centers (CAOCs) that are “comprised of a 
vast array of people, programs and processes” and filled with “thousands of 
computers, dozens of servers, racks of video equipment and display screens.”55  Much 
of this technology is directly relevant to efforts to comply with LOAC.  For example, 
U.S. News & World Report noted that in the CAOC: 
Analysts calculate the size of bomb fragments and the distance they travel 
from the strike site, using detailed maps and video footage to gauge 
potential for human casualties and property damage.  In another area, 
analysts don 3D glasses to read maps that show precise heights of palm 
trees and the walls of any given compound to help determine “collateral 
concerns.”56 
The New York Times also noted that: 
The bombs themselves are chosen carefully and sometimes modified.  
Some designed for air burst are instead programmed with a delayed fuse to 
bury themselves before exploding, thus reducing the blast range.  One sort 
of bomb has even been loaded with less explosive, filled instead with 
concrete, to cause great damage where it hits but no farther.57 
As the Times further reported, Air Force lawyers “vet” the targets to ensure the 
proposed bombing conforms to “a complex body of military law, including the 
Geneva Conventions, acts of Congress and court decisions.”58  In order to perform 
this duty, each of these lawyers had to be specially trained not just on the law of air 
and missile warfare, but also on the systems utilized in the CAOC, as well as a vast 
body of information concerning weapons, munitions, and the strategies for their use. 
Absent such training, legal expertise from a manual or otherwise will be for 
naught.  It just cannot be emphasized enough how important it is for practitioners in 
this area to thoroughly educate themselves on what may be viewed in traditional 
terms as the clients’ “business.”  This is vitally important, because absent such a 
demonstrated understanding of the realities military commanders and their forces 
face, effective legal advice that is accepted is difficult to attain.  Mastery of the AMW 
Manual (and even its Commentary) is not sufficient to minimally qualify an attorney 
to serve as an air and missile operation legal advisor. 
It is also important to understand that as valuable as the AMW Manual or any 
other manual may be in ensuring that the basics of LOAC are observed, in U.S. air 
operations today, the core document is what is called the special instructions 
(SPINS), which include the rules of engagement (ROE).59  ROE are defined by the 
 
55. Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC), U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, U.S. AIR 
FORCES CENTRAL (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.afcent.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12152. 
56. Anna Mulrine, A Look Inside the Air Force’s Control Center for Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (May 29, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/05/29/a-look-inside-the-
air-forces-control-center-for-iraq-and-afghanistan. 
57. Thom Shanker, Civilian Risks Curb Strikes in Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/asia/23military.html. 
58. Id. 
59. See U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate Gen. Corps, Rules of Engagement, in AIR FORCE 
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DoD as “[d]irectives issued by competent military authority that delineate the 
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or 
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.”60  Those 
“circumstances and limitations” usually involve many more constraints than the law 
would itself require.  ROE incorporate myriad policy considerations that may, for 
example, impose limitations on attacks in certain circumstances that are not 
mandated by LOAC, or require out-of-theater approvals by high-ranking 
government officials. 
Put another way, in modern air and missile operations conducted by 
experienced air powers, compliance with the minimum LOAC standards set forth in 
the AMW Manual is not often a challenge; however, compliance with the ROE can 
be.  ROE can be complex because not all of the requirements are intuitive, and 
policy decisions not implicating the law of war can change frequently.  The United 
States is not, of course, alone in having ROE so defined; most nations do, and the 
policy directions they contain can be quite controversial.61  Although most coalition 
operations seek to draft universally accepted ROE, in most circumstances nations 
will retain one or more variances as a matter of national prerogative, or even because 
of differing legal obligations based on those international agreements to which they 
are—or are not—parties. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted in the beginning, the AMW Manual is a tremendous accomplishment, 
one that will serve the relevant communities of interest—practitioners, operators, 
policymakers, journalists, the general public, and more—for years to come.  In fact, it 
may not be possible to improve upon it very much because of the vagaries of the 
acceptance of what is or is not customary international law, as well as emerging 
theories that suggest the hitherto largely unheard of proposition that nations may be 
able to withdraw from customary international law.62  International law, to include 
the law of war, is in a very dynamic age. 
It is important to understand that while the AMW Manual can provide a 
baseline and its users can be assured that following it will not be “wrong” or create 
criminal liability of some sort, it is not without controversy.  Indeed, if there is a 
criticism to be made, it may be that the AMW Manual is too conservative.  The 
controversy, such as it may be, could well focus more on the Commentary than on 
the AMW Manual itself.  Still, there are aspects of the AMW Manual not otherwise 
incorporated into treaty law that may nevertheless rapidly become accepted 
 
OPERATIONS & THE LAW 237 (2009) (“Most SPINS have an ROE subsection, which contains a copy of 
relevant provisions of the applicable ROE . . . .”). 
60. Rules of Engagement, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/ 
doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/r/6783.html. 
61. See, e.g., Andy Bloxham, Soldiers Told Not to Shoot Taliban Bomb Layers, THE TELEGRAPH 
(UK) (July 8, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/8626344/Soldiers-told-
not-to-shoot-Taliban-bomb-layers.html (discussing a controversial ROE policy barring British soldiers 
from shooting insurgents planting roadside improvised explosive devices). 
62. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L. 
J. 202, 204 (2010) (challenging the historical and functional underpinnings of the “Mandatory View” that 
“nations never have the right to withdraw unilaterally” from a customary international law rule “once the 
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customary international law, with the Section S (Surrender) and Section U 
(Contraband, Interception, Inspection and Capture)63 being excellent candidates for 
early recognition. 
This essay has tried to emphasize that to be an effective practitioner in this area 
of the law requires much more knowledge than the AMW Manual can provide.  The 
effective counselor must bring to bear a broad range of knowledge—technical, 
cultural, psychological, and more—all with a cognizance that it must resonate with 
the clientele as a practical and pragmatic enabler of effective warfighting.  With 
respect to considerations beyond the law, per se, an American practitioner may wish 
to note that the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
provide:  “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional 
judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only 
to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political 
factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”64 
Though perhaps not conceived with the role of the lawyer in armed conflict in 
mind, this provision promoting a holistic approach to client issues is nevertheless 
especially relevant in modern air and missile warfare, where each operation is 
subjected to relentless scrutiny by friend and foe alike.  Much of that scrutiny has as 
much to do with the wisdom of a particular act as its technical legality.  The lawyer 
must be prepared to advise on both, and that preparation can require a very 
significant intellectual investment. 
To be clear, the business of war can be quite demanding on those providing 
legal advice; such advice has to be given the right way, and its wider effects must be 
carefully considered.  Recognizing the special nature of this kind of practice does not 
come naturally to some lawyers.  Professor Richard Schragger observed in discussing 
the difference between military and civilian lawyers in the Bush Administration that: 
[M]ilitary lawyers understand that when you ask human beings to kill other 
human beings, rules of decency are required. . . .  Instead of seeing law as a 
barrier to the exercise of their clients’ power, [military lawyers] understand 
the law as a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of power.  Law allows 
our troops to engage in forceful, violent acts with relatively little hesitation 
or moral qualms.  Law makes just wars possible by creating a well-defined 
legal space within which individual soldiers can act without resorting to 
their own personal moral codes. 65 
Thus, efforts like the drafting of the AMW Manual are but one part of the 
overall preparation for lawful, ethical combat.  The AMW Manual can be 
instrumental not just to protecting the lives of innocent civilians, or even to 
defending the perquisites of states, per se.  It can also help to provide a degree of 
confidence, if not comfort, to those who are asked by their nation to perform the 
most difficult of tasks under the most demanding of circumstances.  For this, if 
nothing else, the enormous effort that produced the AMW Manual finds its 
justification. 
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